Where Psychology Fails as a Science of Human Nature

Superfluous, Cosmetic Elements of Scientific Paradigm Undermine Essential Science, Exploration

Thursday, January 30, 2003

Seattle, WA --- A pensive J. Wyatt Ehrenfels stares out the window of the bus he takes into work, mulling over the remnants of a dream, that is, when he isn't contemplating the ruin of psychology or ruining psychology with his contemplation. The Fireflies author claims to have identified what he calls the "four or five loadbearing pillars of (psychology's) professional and academic culture," citing fundamental flaws in venerated practices that have become norms/standards for the research industry/community. On various places throughout his web site, primarily the critically acclaimed 16-points page, the author attacks the null-hypothesis testing system (NHTS), the increasing centrality of the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), and the marginalization of certain data sources and analyses (idiographic, qualitative, exploratory, descriptive) in favor of others (nomothetic, quantitative, confirmatory, inferential, respectively). Ehrenfels cites these practices as part and parcel of a scientific paradigm that impedes comprehensive, inspiration-driven exploration and scrupulous detectivework. "I am referring here to unessential elements of science that make up its social context," clarified Ehrenfels. "It's important to separate the institutional from the scientific requirements. Their celebration and perpetuation of the institutional norms could only be attributed to philistine professors who put other motives before psychologistic phenomena, before the facts of human experience, and before the psyche's frontiers. Tactically, the methods are deployed to perfection often accompanied by sophisticated statistical analyses that lend an impression of legitimacy and rigor. But strategically, the field lacks the methodologies required to explore phenomena larger than a bread box within that indivisible and indissoluble unit of analysis known as the individual." The result, claims Ehrenfels, is a science that is neither grounded in the nature of the phenomena under study, nor infused by the free-wheeling wits and intellectual wherewithall of academics and practitioners, but rather a science that is excessively embedded in social context and institution. "Another consequence is the atrophy of intellectual skills and values that are mission-critical to a science that is authentic, adequate, and accurate. Our vaunted norms have infected the very criteria by we populate our field as well as the attitudes of those who occupy seats on tenure review, faculty selection, and graduate admission committees. It's bad enough we have to appeal to the lowest common denominator of a peer review committee when we submit a work for publication, but it's even worse when you consider the quality of this denominator." Ehrenfels often speaks of professors "ceding their wits and freedoms" to "outside agencies," which include all external sources of validation or requirement ranging from the university department at the local level to granting agencies, managed care, the American Psychological Association, JHACO, HIPAA, and state licensing boards." Psychology has even been faulted for its attempt to imitate harder sciences with cache among public, legislative, and professional circles. "Not only is this not the correct path for psychology, but we fail to realize that we are often imitating scientific models that are obsolete. Physics for example advanced well beyond efficient Newtonian causation, not that we academics and professionals know or care enough to analyze our own profession or epistemology in theory construction terms." Ehrenfels is quick to note that he is not criticizing the field simply because it warrants criticism. "If I could occupy a place in this field and bring my own ideas and skills to bear on psychological phenomena, I would. That is the difference between my adversaries and I. I would not pressure my peers into uniformity. I would not require anyone to bring themselves in line with derived or popular opinion masquerading as 'scientific or professional standard.' I am not rallying to uproot their jobs and replace them with a homogenous collection of people like myself. But I am arguing that the field should allocate places to people whose questions, talents, ideas, and interests compel them to methodological flexibility, fluidity, and originality. Unfortunately, this is an all or none proposition to these 'academics' and 'professionals.' Our false standards and committee review mechanisms do not allow for such individuals to advance themselves or their publications in this field, and most of this field's members would agree that a single unifying standard or framework of expectations is necessary to keep everyone in line or on the same page. There is no place for me in psychology for the very reason that I have not allowed myself to be so pressured. I am not a proxy or instantiation. Just about everyone in the field is either inherently a vapid drone or some creature of imprimatur." Ehrenfels is reluctant to estimate the proportion of academics and practitioners who fall within these categories. "Everyone wants a number, and when you can't come up with one, they claim you have not done the empirical research needed to make your statements. Then when you speak of your extensive life experience, they dismiss it out of hand as anecdotal evidence, which does not surprise me coming from a field with no emic tradition." Ehrenfels explained that the lack of an emic tradition is the most damning and obvious sign of a straw discipline. "This is psychology. We cannot afford to spurn colleagues or candidates who study a small number of individuals indepth, preserving the integrity of what amounts to the vehicle of life, the individual, by drawing conclusions within individuals before abstracting themes across individuals. The way we use statistics today, we just skim data off the top of a large number of psych 101 students and then plug it into some sophisticated statistical formula to adjudicate what amounts to a binary question: do we reject or fail to reject that husk of a meaningful question called a null hypothesis? Nothing is explored. So if you ask me again how many academics and practitioners are problematic, I say 'too many.' How many? 'Enough to erode basic human conduct in their treatment of students and their subject matter, enough to cleave the 'psych-' from the '-ology' and then leave the former on the doorstep like some skanky barn cat."

Will be bring psychology to its knees? He thinks not. "They would have to care about the human condition. But the way they define psychology today, as if any definition isn't problematic enough, they clearly betray its 'psych-' root. Brain, behavior, and something they call 'psychological law' is what they are all about. If you do not know what psychological law means, you only need to know that they contrast it against 'human nature.' They don't want to hear about 'human nature,' the 'human condition,' the 'human psyche' or even 'experience.' They are materialists who have made careers of patently clerical tasks and who use science as a tool of skepticism rather than a tool of exploration. They need to change the name of the field to reflect its destruction."

The author's critique is part of a two-pronged approach, combining dispassionate sociological analysis with more visceral complaints about incidents in which he was politically embattled. "I am often asked, 'why so adversarial? Are you that bitter?' While I will not allow these individuals to characterize my campaign to a roman a clef, I will not be bullied into silence about some rather egregious actions taken against me. They only stand to benefit from my silence. What they did to me itself constitutes rather compelling incrimination, and this story should be told. But by no means does it comprise my whole case. I am familiar with the norms for research, teaching, and mental health delivery and training, and I am capable of determining whether these norms do injustice to individuals and to the human psyche. So it is a two-pronged approach. I am attacking their attitudes toward their students but also their approach to their subject matter. I suspect that if you wish to defeat my argument, you have to defeat me on both fronts."